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Abstract
This paper presents a model where the form of innovations is endogenous. It
is shown that, with labour market imperfections, that raise thc wage above
the shadow price of labour, tirms overinvest in innovations cuttin~ labour
costs and underinvest in increasing quality. As a result, the market outcome
features lower long run growth, higher unemployment and lower welfare
than tlie social optimum. It is further shown tliat firms' incentives to cut
lafwur costs are increased as wages rise, as the industry lxcomes more
competitive and as the industrvs growth rate falls behind the ecunomy wide
growth rate.
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lThis paper introduces a model with two t~l-~:~. ,: in~:. ~ ~.. ~.~:: ,nr,u~.,:;i~::; tyl ~::. ,
product innovation, in the sense that it inereases product q;~aury. fhe other type is a
process innovation that reduces firms' fixed labour costs. The R~cus un these two
innovation types is justified below.
lt is shown that with labour union bargainin~ or efticiency ~~aee imperfections
in the labour market, firms overinvest in cuttin~ fixed labour casts and underinvest in
increasing quality. Hence the first result of the paper is normative: thc market outcome
features lowcr long run grow[h, higher unemployment and lo~~er ~~'elfarc than die social
optimum. The second (positive) restdt of the paper is that tirms' inccnti~ cs tu cut labour
costs are increased as wages rise, as the industry becomes more competitive and as the
industry starts to decline, in the sense that its growth rate falls behind the economy wide
growth rate.
The main motivation for this paper stems from the observation thcu in the 1980s
and 90s tu-ms invested heavily in downsizing. Recent examplrs are National
Westminster bank, ATBr.T and IBM. As documented by Audretsch ( 1995: 27) and
Sampson (1995), the mass firings that followed from this downsizing involved to a great
extent middle managers. In the popular press there were doubts about the welfare
consequences of firing people while unemployment was in fact quite hi~.h already. But
the tirms claimed these lay otis were necessary to increase efficiency.
This paper takes a general equilibrium point of view and shows that firms were
right in that firin~ employees improves etTiciency. Moreover these ~~orkers can be
allocated to other sectors in the economy. tn other words, there is nothi.ig wrong with
downsizing as such. However, it is also shown that tinns tend to overinvest in
improving efficiency in d~is way, thereby increasing unemployment and reducing
2welfare. The intuition is that with an etliciency wage or labour union bargaining
impertèction in the labour market, the wage rate exceeds the shadow price of labour. A
firnis gain from firing an employee is the wage rate, while a social planner's gain is only
the shadow price of labouc So indeed there are welfare losses associated with firing
middle managers in times of unemployment.
The second motivation for this paper is to capture the notions 'defensive' and
'enterprise' investments. As discussed below, defensive investments cut costs but leave
output unchanged. While entrepreneurial investments lead to product improvements
that expand output. The explanation Eltis (1996) and Kitson and Michic (1996) give for
[3ritai~is dismal performance in manufacturing since 1960 is a bias to~cards defensive
investments in the UK. This paper shows that this bias may be due tu the institutional
setting in the UK where 1he bargaining power of latwur unions has been high.
Moreover, I show that this bias is indeed welfare reducin~, as claimed by Eltis, Kitson
and Michie.
This paper adds two new points to thc endogenous growth literature on
unemployment, which is discussed belaw. First, the normative question of technological
progress has not been analysed before. The literature has concentrated on the positive
question of the correlation between growth and unemployment. Second. where previous
papers have considered the relation between unemployment and the speed of
technolo~-ical prugress. here theJi,rm of technological progress is endogenous.
In particular, innovations have two dimensions: a quality dimension and a tixed
cost dimensiun. Human capital in the research and development (RBr.D) sector can be
used to increase the yuality ofthe next innovation or to reduce the tixed cost component
of the production technology for the next innovation. In the production pnxess of final
3goods there is only one input, labour. Whereas the tirst dimension aftects the quality of
the final output, the tixed labour component can be interpreted as th~ organisational
overhead ofthe production process.
There are three arguments to motivate the analysis of this t~~o dimensional
innovation process. First, as noted above, downsizing irrvolves to a great extent middle
management, which is part of a tirm's organisational overhead. Sincc the number of
managers is not directly related to a finn's output level, it is bettrr mn.lrlled as a tixed
than as a variable labour cost. Thus downsizing is modelled as a reduction in li~ed
labour costs.
Second, as long as the finn's demand function is sufficiently ~lastic, marginal
cost reductions as such cannot explain firing of emplo~~ees al the lirm krel. As an
illustration, consider a monopolist facínp an inverse demand flinction ul'the fonn p(x) -
x~'"`', where x is the output level and 0 ~ a ~ 1. Assume this firm produces one unil of
output using c units of labour at a wage w. Then the firm chooses output level x(c) -
argmax„~ ,xi'"''.r - cwx;. It is routine to verify that total employment cx(c) increases as
c falls, ~[cx(c)]~dc ~ 0. That is adopting a labour saving innovation. in the form of
lowering marp.inal costs c, incrcu.,r., employment instead of causin- unemployment.
The intuition is, ofcourse, that a reduction in marginal costs c leads to a fàll in the firm's
price level. This fall in price level leads again to such a rise in demand that output and
employment rise. However, an innovation that reduces the fixed labour cost leads
unambiguously to employees being tired.
Finally. this framework gives a formalisation of the distinction between
enterprise and defensive investments used by economic historians, as f~r instance Eltis
(1996: 184.186). Enterprise investments increase a firm's output and employment level
4by increasing the product range or by improving the quality of a tirm's products.
Defensive investments, on the other hand, cut costs and employment but leave product
range and quality unchanged. In the t~amework here, enterprise investments are related
to the quality improvements of final output, while defensive investments correspond to
innovations reducinp, fixed costs. Kitson and Michie (199G: 198) make a similar
distinction ~chen they ubserve that in the UK 'manufacturin~ productiviq~ grew in the
1980s ... larpely due to job cuts rather than increased output and thrse jobs were not
being lost in a period of full employment when thc labour woitld be taken up
productively elsewheré . This paper ar~ues that such job cuts, which do nut raise output,
increase unemployment and reduce welfare.
The theoretical literature has focussed on the positive question of the relation
between growth and unemployment. As claimed by Qean and Pissarides (199,),
empirically there is no clear correlation between these two phenomena, not over time
nor in cross sections over countries. The theoretical literature retlects this lack of clear
empirical e~ idence by showing that the effect of gmwth on wiemployment is
ambiguous. Pinally, the models used have one dimensional innovations that reduce
marginal costs or eyuivalendy increase yuality.
Aghiun and Howitt (1994) start with an exogenously given gru~~th rate and a
search and matching imperfection in the labour market. They show that higher growth
has two opposite effects on unemployment. On the one hand, there is the capitalization
effect of hi~her groH1h which leads to lower unemployment. That is. higher growth
makes it more attractive to start a firm and post vacancies, thereby reducing
unemployment. On the other hand, there is the creative destruction elÏect of higher
growlh which causes tinns to replace one another at higher speed. This leads to higher
5labour tumover and hence increases unemployment. Further, the hi~her speed of
creative destruction, reduces the value of starting a new finn. Thus it becomes less
attractive to start a new tirm and post vacancies. These (direct and indirect) crcati~e
destruction cffects cause a positivc relation bet~~een gro~~th and uncmhlu~ ment. V~'ith a
similar set up, Mortensen and Pissarides (1995) show that the capitalization effèct is
likely to dominate in industries where the costs of implementing a n~~c t~chnolog~ in an
old plant are low. The creative destruction effects dominate in industries w'ith high
implementation costs. Since implementation costs are likel~ to ~an ~~'idcl~ o~'cr
industries, thcre is no rcason to cxlxct a clear positi~c ur nc~aticr as,uciati~in bct~~rrn
growth and unemployment at the country level. The same conclusion tiillo~~s f~rom I3ean
and ['issarides (1993), who link gro~~th to savings and model wiemplu~'mcnt through a
search and matching imperfection in the labour market. "ihey show that depending on
the exogenous parameters that dil~tèr over time or bctween cuuntrics thc relatiun
between gro~~th and unemployment can be positive or ne~ative.
Finally, Groot and Van Schaik (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (1997) find a
clear negative associa[ion benveen growth and unemployment. In Groot and Van
Schaik, there is a dual labour market with wait unemployment. Then a rise in
unemployment benetits roises wait unemployment. This reduces thc prutitability of
producing hi~h-tech goods. Hence RKD and the rate of growth are reduced. Daveri and
Tabellini e~amine the etlects of high taxes on labouc They claim that in countries with
strong decentralised labour unions, high taxes on labour translate into hi~h wage costs
for firms. This in turn reduces labour demand and creates unemployment. Further, as
tinns' capital-labour ratio rises. the marginal product of capital falls which reduces
savings and grotiTh. The extent to which the rise in lalwur taxes passcs through into
6higher wages, depends on how strong and how decentratised the unions are. Controlling
for such differences between countries, they find a negative relation between growth and
unemployment in their data. They suggest that the lack ofcorrelation found by Bean and
Pissarides (1993) is caused by their omission to condition un the diflèrent ways in
which labour unions are organised in countries.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the model.
Section 2 solves for the private outcome. Section 3 compares the private outcome to the
social optimum and section 4 concludes the paper.
I. Thc modcl.
Consider an economy with two sectors. The uutput level of sector I is denuted by x, and
the output level of sector r by x,. The analysis focuses on the innovation choices of
sector 1 and sector r is interpreted as the rest ofthe economy aggregated into one sector
producing a composite commodity. The CES utility titnction at tinte t of the infinitely
lived consumers is given by u(x,.x,.t) -(q,z," t r~c")"" wrth O ~~ ~ I. where y, denotes
the quality of good 1 and r, the aggre~ate quality of good r at time t. Thc time paths ofq,
and r, are considered below. It is assumed that sector I is small comparrJ to the rest of
the economy, which can be represented here as r, ~ y, for each t. As shown below, a low
value of the ratio q,lr, translates into a small share of sector I in the total revenue of the
economv.
Consumers maximise lifetime utility E,w fi' In[u(x,,.a,,,t)~ subject to an
intertempural budget constraint, where S is the discount factor. In each period, I choose
total e~penditure as numeraire. ]t is routine to verify that the consumers' maximisation
problem at time t with expenditure in each period normalised to 1, that is
7max~~ . {~9~xi` tr,x,"~"~Puxi tPnx~ -1~.




As usual. I assume that firms choose output le~els to ma~imise pn~lits. taking A, as
~iven. In both sectors tirms produce with constant marginal custs cyual to l. As
discussed below, in order to keep the maths simple l assume that innu~ atinns are ahvays
drastic. Hence the tirm in sector I with the patent on q, choosrs ~„ to solve max,
;q,A,á"-"'x - w,x;, where w, denotes the wage rate at time t. The lirms in the othcr
sectors of the economy choose their output levels in a similar wa~. I)uc to the wrll
known a~~regation property' of CGS utility functions, this nieans that x„ eyuals the
solution to max, ;r,A,.ri'-"'x - w,x;. It follows that
n.i~~~ x„ - (- '' and Pn - ~
..,n, xn -r~- r„
and Pn -„.
Substituting the expressions fo1r p„ and p„ in equation (1) yields




For retèrence below, detine s„ as sector 1's share in revenue at timc t. s„ -""''~ ~~„ ~,~~,~ „
Because p„ - p„ - w,la. it follows that s„ -~,-. Then eyuations (~)-(-I1 imply





Notice that the price cost margin in each sector equals (p„ - w,)Ip;, - I- a, with i- I, r.
Thus a fall in a leads to a rise in the price cost margin. Therefore. as in Aghion and
Howitt (1992), a fall in a is interpreted as a rise in market power, and conversely high a
industries are called competitive. Finally, with equations (2)-(4) utility at time t can be
written as
U(xi~.x„.t)- -(9t~:, ~r~-1- (~)
and total variable labour demand equals
x„ f x„ - - (~)
The wage w, is determined by labour market equilibrium. "T'he a~ents' inelastic
supply of labour is nonnalised at I. In order to introduce unemploymcnt. I assume that
the labour market features efTciency wages or labour union bargaininp, which are
modelled here as follows. The wa~e level depends negatively on the unemployment
level w, - b( I-~.,''), with b'(.) ~ 0 and 7~;' total labour demand at time t.
The idea of b'(.) ~ 0 with labour union bar~aining is that hiph unemployment
weakens the labour unioiis bargainin~ position. [hereby leading to luwer wa.e levels. In
the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) etliciency wage model. a tinn otfers a hi~sh wage to an
employee to stop him from shirking. If the employee is found shirking he is tired. When
unemployment is high, it will take a tired employee long to tind a new.job. This is an
incentive for the employee not to shirk and hence the tinn can offer him a lower wage
that still induces the employee to work. Thus both imperfèctions arr captured by the
negative relatíon between wages and unemployment, w, - b(1-~.;'). abo~~e.
9In the model here, labour demand at time t equals )~;' - x„ f x,, t f. where t; is
the fixed labour cost ofthe firm in sector 1, as discussed below. Using eyuation (7), this
can be written as l,'' - alw, t t;. The following lemma shows that a reduction in tixed
labour cost t; leads to an increase in unemployment and a reductiun in the wage level.
Similarly, an inerease in market pow~er, that is a reduction in a, leads i~~ an increase in
unemployment. The intuition is that tinns with more monopoly powcr are inclined to
produce less output at a given wage rate. Hence they hire less labour and unemployment
is higher. This is the negative static effect of market power on emplo~ nunt. [3elow this
static eftèct is contrasted with the dynamic effect ofmarket powcr un uncmplo~ ment.
Lemma 1
t3(1-7~,'')18t; ~ 0 and ~7w,lc~f, ~ 0,
rJ(1-7~,~)Ir3a ~ 0 and rhvfrJat ~ 0.
Proof
The first inequality follows from ~Jw,lat; - [-b'(.)]I(It[-b'(.)]alw,') ~0. since b'(I-alw,-t;)
~ 0. So an increase in f, increases the wage rate by reducing unemploymeni. The second
inequality follows from rhv,lí~at -([-b'(.)]Iw,)I(I}[-b'(.)]alw,') ~ O.C
Now I turn to the structure of innovations in the nwdel. Since the locus of this
paper is on the innovation decisions in sector l, the innovations in sector r are
exogenously given both for the agents and the social planner. So the time path r, is taken
as fixed and the level ot' fixed costs in sector r is nomialised at 0.
10In sector 1, an innovation at time t has a quality dimension y, and a tixed cost
dimension f,. Following the endogenous growth literature, the research laboratory that
wins the patent race sells an infinitely lived patent on the innovation to a production
firm. This firm then starts to produce in sector I with this technology, until it is replaced
by a firm ~~ ith the next (higher yuality) innovation. As innovations hcre have two
dimensions ulrcady, to keep things simple the frequency of innovations is assumed to be
fixed. In particular, there is an innovation for sector I in each time period. t- I, 2, 3...
At time t, the RBcD laboratories invest to win the patent on innovation (Y,.,,t;,,),
which pmduces good I with quality q,,, - y,.,y, and tixed costs t; ,. Fur ease oF
exposition. it is assumed that Rx.D labexatorics employ human capital unly and no
labour, ~~~hich is used only for production'. Further, suppose human capital is supplied
inelastically. These two assumptions fascilitate the analysis ot' tirms innovation bias
towards defensive investments. Now the resource constraint for the Rb:.D sector can be
modelled by thr reyuirement that (y,-,,I;-,) e I,., where the innovation p~~ssibility set 1,.,
e:N' is assumed to hc compact. Further it is assumed that all innovatiuns are drasiic.
That is at anv time t, for each f? 0 it is the case that ma~., ; y ~(y,t) e I,., ;? Ila. With
y,., ? Ila the innovation is drastic, as can be seen as follows. The tirm with the patent on
quality y,., - Y,.,q, sets a price equal to p,,,, - w,,,la as in equation Q). Then the firm
with the patent on quality q, leaves the market, since with quality ~~p y, ,? Ilcx it cannot
produce protitably at this price level ~i,.,lu. Further, it must br Ihc casc liu each t? 0
that min,., ; f ~(y,t) e I,.,; ~ I. Otherwise the tirni in sector I cannot pruduce since total
labour supply eyuals I. Figure 1 gives an example ofa convex set I,.,.
Figure I liere
IITo interpret the set 1,.,, one can think of two ways to use human capital. One is
technical in the sense that is used to increase the quality of a product b~ y,.,. The other
use is in the realm of management consultants seeking to reducc th~ ur~anisational
overhead f,,,. When a lot of human capital is used to reduce tixed custs. less human
capital is available to increase the quality of the product. The social plnnner takes the
structure ofthe Rc~D sector as given in the sense that the innovation possióilit~ set I, , is
the same for the social optimum anJ the private outcome. It is thr chuicr uf the point
(y,.,,f.,) e I, , that differs as the ne~t hvo sections show.
2. Thc privatc outcome.
Without specifying the details of the RRD sector, II IS aSSUlflcd that thc laboratol~ that
wins the patent on (y,.,.t;.,) sells it tu a production tirnt in sector I and tcts a sharc oCthe
protits'. Since the innovation is dr.lstic by assumption. eyuation (3) implies that thc
protits of the production timt with (y,.,.t;.,) equal
a,(Y,.,.t,.,.ttl)-max ' (~ A a-u-"~c-w x-w f' ' C211 It~lal91 1.1 Isl Isl 1.11
1-„ (aY1.191A1.i
- „ "'Lil )1--wl.lt~l,l w,.,
until the firm is replaced next period by technology (y,.,,t;.,).
(KI
Qecause the RáD laboratory gets a share ot'the protits, it chuoses (y,.,,f,.,) to
solve
ma~.,.rEl~.l nl(Y.f.ttl). (~)
where it takes A,., as given, like the firnts.
Prooosition ?
The private outcome (y,.,,f,.,) is a solution to
12mrs~~.i(Y~-rf,.i) e Oh-i(Y~.rf.i) (ID)
a~,~r.r.~.i~.
where the private marpinal rate of substitution is detined as mrs;',,(y.ll --,,~ ~,~,.,,,~;
~
and the superdifferential as 01,.,(y,t) -; p e:H~ (y'-y) 5 p(f'-t) for each (y'.f') e 1,,, ;.
Proof
First note that the optimisation problem in (9) has a solution because a,(y,f,ttl) is
continuous in y and f, as can be seen in equation (8), and the sct I, , is con,pact by
assumption. Second note that the set 01,.,(y.t) is conve~, hence it is a suhinterval of ~ti.
Now suppose the claim is not true, then one ofthe following two situatiuns must arise:
. mrs;, (y,,,,t;.,) ~ p for each p e 01,.,(Y,.,.f,.,), but then reducing fand y sliphtly along
the boundary of I,., increases protits;
. mrs~'.i(K.rt;.,) ~ p tiir each p e 01,.,(K-,.f,.,). but then incrcasing f and y slightly
along the boundary of [,., increases profits.
Therefore, if mrs;,, (y,.,.f,,,) é 01,.,(y,.,,t;,,), it cannot be the case that (y,.,.t;.,) solves the
maximisation problem in equation (9).C
If the boundary of I,., is differentiable, equation (IQ) reduces to the familiar
result that (Y, ,.1;.,) is a tanpency point of I,,, and an isoprotit line n,(y.l'.ttl )- constant.
Note that proposition 2 gives a neccssary condition for (y,,,.F.,) to sulvr (9), but not a
suflicient condition. However the results below hold for all solutions to (10) so in
particutar it holds tbr the optimum. 'I'he next proposition characterises thc mrs'' in terms





Equation (8) .implies - ~i,,~ái.i.n-wi.i and
a.,n.r.~.n--
ar
„-r,i~~~.~ ! . Furthcr, the
expression for A,., in (4) yields dn,(y,t;tt I)Idy - s,,.,ly.~~
The next result shows how a change in parameters chan~~es nu,;,,(y,t) lix nl!
(y,f) e ~i; . It is straightforward to show that if mrs;,(y,t) is increased tix all (y,t). then
y,,, and f,,,, in the solution to (9), fall. Similarly, ifmrs;,, (y,t) is reduced liir all (y,t), then
y,., and f;., rise. Writing the wage relation temporarily as ~a,,, - (ib( I-n'', ,), it is routine
to verify that a rise in scalar Q increases the wage rate w,.,. Such a risr in (3 can be
interpreted as an exogenous rise in labour union bargaining pavicer fiir a given
unemployment level. !n terms of the efficiency wage model, a risc in ~3 can be
interpreted as a fall in the detection probability of shirking workers. Such an exogenous
rise in a has been represented in (ii) below, by a slight abuse of notation, as an increase






(ii) , - o,
c~c,.,
14Bmrs~~,,
(iii) r~ ; o .
Proof
Using the expression for mrs;',, (y. ~-;", " in proposition 3.
1 i
(i) follows 1'rom `s'~}' - Y'-" !}( r~.~,q,l'-a
~t~~.il9~~ `1r~.il9r~
~ o together with the ubservation that
w,., - b( I-al~a~,.,-t) does not depend on r,.,ly„
(ii) follows fi-om proposition i immediately.
(iii) follows both from rs"'' - l~}~~."~IY~')I-uJ ~osince sector I is small compared
i.tl-a)- r~(I-a)
to the rest of the economy, r,., ~ Yy,. and from rhv,.,lr3at ~ 0 as derived in Irmma I.~
The tirst result says that if sector t grows more slowly over time than the rest of
the econom~. that is r,.,lq, increases over time, the innovations in sector I move in the
direction of investing more in lowering tixed costs than in increasin~ yuality. This is in
line ~~ith casual ohservation that tirms in declining industries. that is industries which
e~perience ~sro~~th lower than the economy average, tend to tiicus nu~rr and more on
cost cuttin~. fhe reason is that increasing the quatity of a product is more protitable the
more products you sell. So as an industry becomes marginatized in the economy (qlr
decreases) tirms invest more in cost cutting than in increasing quality. Although such
efficiency enhancing measures are usually welcomed by the stackmarket, the next
section sho~~s that tirms overinvest in defensive investments. Pinall~. note that for a
15given time path r,, this tendency stren~thens itselt: As research laburatories start to
invest more in reducing fixed costs, quality in sector I grows ma~e slu~~iy over time,
thereby increasing the relative quality r,,,lq„ ~ahich leads again to morr investment in
reducing fixed costs.
The second result says that countries with hi~h wa~e levets. rithrr due to hi~h
union bargaining power or due to low shirking detection pn,babifitirs. trnd to imest
more in reducing tixed costs than in yuality improvements. The intuitiun is that hither
wages lead to higher cost savings as tixed labour is tired. A tentati~e interpretation of
this result could retèr to the E3ritish bias towards detènsive investments at'ter the second
world war, as mentioned in the introduction. Due to the institutional srtting in the UK,
the bargainint power of labour unions has been high, as discussed b~ lic:~n anJ Cratts
(1996: 1~4). As this has led to high wage levels, result (ii) implies. in line ~cith the
observations of Cltis (199G: 184.18G), that investment becomes morc detènsive in
character, reducing tixed costs rather than increasing quality of pruducts. Indeed this
bias towards lowering f leads to higher unemployment levels as shown in lemma I. This
is my interpretation of the linding by Kitson and Michie (1996: 1951. mentioned in the
introduction. that in the UK 'manufacturing productivity grew in the I~JR(ls ... largely
due to job cuts rather than increased output and these jobs were not heing lost in a
period of full employment when the labour would be taken up productively elsewhere'.
The w-elfare implications of employees being fired while there is unempluyment already
in the econonn~ are discussed below.
The last result implies that more competitive industries (that is hi~h a industries)
are more preoccupied with cost cutting than with quality improvements. This is due to
two eftècts. rirst. there is an appropriability effect. More competition implies that firms
16appropriate a smaller share of consumer surplus. Therefore they arr Icss willing to
invest to improve quality. The other effect is a labour market etfect. Since an increase in
competition leads to higher output levels, labour demand increases, as shown in lemma
I. This raises the wage level. Hence in a competitive economy, lhere is more incentive
for tirms to reduce tixed costs.
Since yuality improvements are harder to measure empirically than cost
reductions, this results sheds a new li~ht on the weltàre implicatiuns ul rrsults li~und by
fbr instance Nickell (1996) and Porter (1990). They tind that more cnmpetition gives
tirms a highcr incentive to improve efticiency. However, if these efticirncy ~ains come
largely from tixed cost reductions, the next section shows that they are welfare
reducing. Of course, if the efticiency gains in competitive industries, tiiund by Nickcll
and Porter, cume through marginal cost reductions (which are in thc Iramework here
equivatent to qualiq improvements) there will be welfare gains. Yet thc 11-amework here
points out that equating etïiciency gains with welfare f:ains is not correct in general.
The el'1'ect of market power on unemployment is ambiguous. Por given q, and
r,.,, a rise in competition a reduces unemployment since more a~mpetitive tinns
produce higiirr output levels, as shuwn in lemma I. On the other hund. such a rise in a
inereasesnus;'.,(y,.,.f,.,), which reduces y,., and t;,, because more c~,mpetitive finns
appropriate less of the consumer surplus associated with a rise in quality. This dynamic
eflèct of competition, related to the fonn of innovations chosen h~ lirms, increases
unemployment by encouraging downsizing. The curvatw-e of the inno~ation possibility
set I,., deterniines the magnitude of the latter effect and whether or nut it dominates the
fonuer. In other words, with labour union bargaining or efticienc~ wages die static
nef;:ui~ e effect ol' product market power on employment, as discussed by for instance
17Layard et aL (1991: 27), has a dynamic counterpart. From a dynamic point of view,
market power makes firms more inclined [o adopt enterprise invesUncnts rather than
defensive imestments, thereby decreasing unemployment.
3. The social optimum.
This section considers the welfare implications of the private outcomc. It is shown that
in each period the social planner prefers to raise y and f comparcd ~~ith the private
outcome (y,.,.t;.,) in eyuation (9).
The social planner's welfare function is the consumers' discounted utility
~,,,,5'In[u(x,,.x,,,t)j, where the social planner takes the labour markrt impcrfection and
output choices of tirnis as given. As shown in equation (G), this yields utility at time t
equal to u(x,,.x,,,t) -,-~y,- t r,~-) ~ where the wage rate w, solves ~~, - hl I- alw, - t;).
Hence the social plamier chooses a seyuence of innovations ;(y,.l;) e I, ;,-, to ma~imise
welfare E,,,~~'In[u(x,,,x„.t)] as oftime 0:
( r(~7~ l 1
W(qn.t;,.S.O)-ntax~21S'{Ina-Inw,t~-"InIl11,-,Y,yol-}r,~' J
I. (II)
Assuming r5 is small enough that the right hand side of ( I I) converces. this optimisation
problem can be rewritten as a[3ellman eyuation. Then the social planner at time t
chooses (y.t) to solve
W(q~.t;.S,t)-mas,.,.nEi~.~ilna-htw~-it~~:'In[(Yy~)'"tr~a]tSW(Yy~.l~.~ti.ttl)~. (12)
Weltàre W at time ttl depends on y because the higher the quality increase now, the
higher the yuality level enjoyed in the future. As in the endopenous pro~~th literature.
for instance Aghion and Howitt (1992: 338), the tirm that buys the patent of an
innovation overlooks the positive spillover of an increase in yuality on the next
18innovations which will be bought by future firms. This is called the intertemporal
spillover effect. Since a social planner does take this spillover effect into account, tirnts
tend to underinvest in increasing quality as compared to the social optimum.
"I'here may also be knowledge spillovers that are overloukcd hy tinns. For
instance, increasing quality now may ~,enerate knowledge that facilitates future quality
improvements. Or reducing fixed costs now may facilitate future ti~ecl cost reductions,
~shich would lead to -~W(.,ttl)~~3f ~ 0 in (12). Moreover, it is possible that reducing
tised costs (increasing quality) now generates knowledp,e that Iacili[ates yuality
impro~ements (fixed cost reductions) in the future. In order to avuiJ the cumparison of
knowledge spillovers fmm y and f, which are very hard to quantity empirically, such
knowledge spillovers are assumed absent here.
For the welfare results below to hold, I only need that knowledge spillovers
generated by a reduction in f;., are small compared to the .~rnu uf thc intertemporal
spillover cftcct and the kiiowledge spillovers generated by a risc in y, ,. l)ne can check
that theorem 6 belov.~ holds as well if-r7W(.,[tl)Idf is small comparcd to ~W(.,tfl )Ir7y
in (12). This may not be an unreasonable assumption. It seems that organisational
structures change horizontally over time in the sense that some structures are better
suited to some environments but not to others`. Therefiire impro~cments in one
organisational structure, say Ford's muss production organisation, do nut necessarily
spill over to improvements in the mure marketing orientated organisations in the 1970s.
In this sense lhe model assumes that a reduction in organisational o~crhead at time t
does not lead to knowledge which permanently lowers the level of tixed costs in the
futurc.
19Further note that whether knowledge spillovers from reducing t;., exist or not,
sustained long run growth is only driven by the time paths of the qualiq' indices q, and
r,. This can be seen as follows. Suppose that through invesunents in reducing tixed
costs, t; com~erges to 0 over time. This reduces wages w, over time, thcreby increasing
output levels and utility. However, the smaller fixed costs become. thc smallcr the effect
of a further reduction in f on wa~es and utility and hence the smallrr thc effect on the
growth rate of utility. As fixed costs approach 0, the ettect on growlh of imesunents in
reducing f becomes negligible. This is the fundamental diftèrence hctween quality
improvements and tixed costs reductions. As tixed costs becomr small, tluther
reductions in tixed costs have negli~ible etfec[s, but increases in qualit~ I;ccp teneratinc
growth effects. Hence the only contribution of sector I to sustained lung run growth
comes through investments in quality Y,.,.
If knowledge spillovers are absent, W(.,t) no longer depends on t; and (12)
becomes
W(q~.S,t) - masr~.ria,.~ ihta - Inw, , t~,-;" In[(Y9~ )'" f r~a ] t SVV(YcL.ii.tt I) i ( I~)
with w,,, - h( I- a.hv,., - t;.,). Further, without knowledge spillovers thc effect of y,., on
W(..t} I ) equals
~'W(Y~-i4~.S.ttl)-~ fi~-
'7i.i r-i ~ i (14)
where (14) can be derived directly from ( I I) or recursively ti-om ( I~).
The social planner's choice of (y,t) in the innovation possibility set I,., is
determined by the social marginal rate of substitution, defined as
20 .d;lna - In w,.i . ~-" Inl(Y9i )'- f r„'i ~tBW(Y9i.fi.1 t Il~ ,
mrs~.i(Y, f) - -
l ~di
dllna-Inw~.i t~„~~ ~n[(Y9i)'- tr;.ï JtSW(Y9~.S.tt I);,
i ~tY








Pollo~rs immediately from ditï~erentiating ;Ina - Inw,., t';;` In
SW(yq,.S.t}I ); with respect to y and f respectively.~]
179~1~' tr;;i~ t
As thc proposition shuws, although in the pri~~ate outcome in pruposition 3 the
wage lerrl is relr~ant, in the social outconre the rclative changc in thc wage rate
(dw,,,ldtllw, , is important. fhe social planner only imests in reducim- li~rd custs to the
extent that thc resulting increase in wiemployment decreases the wa~e rate [hereby
increasing thc output levels of sectors I and c Further, the intertemporal spillover et~ect
is represented b} dW(.)~r7y ~ 0 in the denominator of mrs'. This works in the direction of
lowerin- mrs' and hence of the social planner being willing to in~~cst more in yuality
than the pri~ate outcome. The next result shows that this is in tàct alwacti the case in the
model here.
~lTheorem 6
IfS- 0 then ~nrs'~' (Y f)--'~'~~'' ~ I, and more generally ~~ mrs,.i(Y.f) ~ ~
for each S? 0 it is the case that "'rs'"(Y't ) ~ i.
mrs;',, (y. f)
Proof
From propositions 3 and ~ it follows that
mrs;., (Y, f) -
mrs~',, (y, f) -
Hence if S-O, one gets
~~,.~





Substi[utinp ''i;,.' - ~.i-~,~'~i- , as shown in the proofof lemnta I. inta ( I G) ~~ields
mrs;.~ lY. t~) I-b' (. )1 „`-
- ~I ,, „
nvs,.i(Y,f1- ~tI-b~( )~„-
since b'(I - alw~,., - t;.,) ~ 0.
In order to prove the result for S~ 0, note that the expression for r'~~L'(yy,,S,ttl)Iciy in
(14) is increasing in S because s,,,,.zlay,., is positive for each t ? 0. I Icnce increasing fi
in ( I 5), reduces
'nrs;,, (Y, f) and therefore 'nrs'~' (Y' f) ~ I for each S? O.J
mrs~',, (y, f) mrs~',, (y,f)
To understand this result, tirst consider the benchmark case without
imperfections. That is, choose S- 0 to eliminate the. intertemporal spillover etiect and
let the wage clear the labour market, alw,,, t f-1. Then it follows that w,., - al(1-F)
?2and dw. Idf - w', la. Substitutint this in e uation 16) above "'rs"'(Y't) ~~ ~ i 1: 9 ( yields - I.
inrsi~.i(Y, t)
Hence without labour market imperfections and ignorin~ the intertemporal spillover
effect, the private and social incentives coincide.
Labour market imperfections as union bargaining and etticiencv wages lead to
unemployment in equilibrium and a wage level that lies above the shadow price of
labour. Therefore the social marginal rate of substitution is smaller than Ihe private
marginal ratr of substitution for all y and f Consequenth~, the social plunner will choose
y and i that exceed the private outcome (y,.,,t;,,) in (9). In uther ~rords, firms in the
private outcome overinvest in reducing tixed costs and underinvest in incrcasing yuality
and hence sustained long run grorrth. Introducing the intertemporal spillover effect (fi ~
0) strengthens this result.
So comparin~ the private and the social outcome, one tinds lu~rcr sustained long
run growth, higher unemployment and lower welfare in the private uutcome. In other
words, the above analysis suggests a mechanism that leads the market to choose a form
of technological progress that reduces welfare and increases unemployment. So indeed
there is reason to he sceptical about the welfare effects of downsizing. Although
downsizin~ improves the tirm's etticiency level and may theretiire hc rrelcomed by
stockmarkets, firms overinvest in it. Overinvestment in do~rnsizin~ increases
unemployment and reduces welfare. Note that this result has been established without
asswning that unemployment benefits have to be paid by the governmcnt which would
introduce another negative externality of downsizing overlooked hy firms. Such
considerations strcngthen the result above that firms overinvest in firim- pcople.
234. Conclusion.
This paper has endogeniud the fonn of technological progress by introducing a
framework with two dimensional innovations. Fimis can invest to increase the quality of
their product. or to reduce the tixed labour costs of the production prc~crss. It has be~n
shown that tirnis overinvest in reducing tixed labour costs and underin~ rst in increasing
quality. This leads to higher unemployment. lower long run ~.rowth ancl I~~~~rr ~cclfarr in
the private outcome as compared to the sucial optimum. In this sensr I think that thc
mass tirings in the 19ROs and 90s have indeed been ~~eltàre reducinc. ;~Ithuu~:h the~
have raised tinns' etïiciency levels. In the same vein, this Frame~~ork can r~plain ~~h~
UK manufacturing tirms' bias towards defensive investments in 19ftOs ma~ have bccn
welfare reducing.
further, it has been shown that tirnis' incentives to invest in dcfensive projects
are higher in high wage industries, in more competitive industrics and in declining
industries.
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This note shows the aggregation property of the CES utilit}' function rcl~ned to in the
text. To prove this property the time index, used in the text, can be dropprd here.
Let the utility function for the desapgregated case he
u(x,.x......x~~) - ~~i-~q~x~ ~ ~
where q; deno[es the quality of good i. Each good i is produced h~ onl~ unc tinn which
is a monopolist in its market.
With expenditures nornialised to l, the consumers' maximisation problem
, u„ 1
max,~ . E~-~9~x~ ~ IE"~ P~x, - 11





Then, with monopolistic competition, each firm chooses x; so as to maximise protits
x; e argmax~ ~9;Ax-'~-"~x-w~;.
where it takes A as given and with the cost structure as in the test.
It is routine to verifv that
xi-~qWA~-
as in equation (2) in the text.
Nuw ifone wants to focus on sector I only, goods 2.....n can hc hrou~ht together
in a composite conunodity x, with a~gregate quality index q~ as shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma
Define the quality index q, and the composite commodity x, as
q~ -~:,9~' ~~
x, - (~,, 4 x;`
~,~
that is q, is a CGS average ofthe yuality levels q,,...,q„ and x, is a CES wcigthed average
ofthe output levels of firms 2.....n.
28Proof
In order to show that these definitions of the composite good and its quality index are
consistent with my use of them (as r, and x„) in the text, 1 have to show two things.
First, it has to be the case that u(x„x,) -~q~x; tq~x,"~~ ~~ -~~;.,q;x~ ~~ ~~, which can be
verified as f~~llows: u(x~,x ~" t ~. ,)- 9i~ i y~~~~., ~; x~ -~qixi t~i:~y,s;')
,.
Second, it needs to be the case that x, -~~y'A~-, as in equation (~) in the text. This
w







Finally, one can dctine a price inde~ p,, which is a CES weighted avcrage of p,,...,p,,.
However, since for each good i it is the case that p; - wla, it is no surprisc that p, - wla
as well.
Note incidentally that the assumption in the text that sector I is small compared
to the rest of the economy (r, ~ y, liir each t) can here lxx written as y, y,. Then the
detinition ofy, abo~ e shows that this assumption will be satistied il' n is hi~ enough, that
is if there are enough other sectors in the cconomy apart from sector I.
~„
29' Hence this paper dces not compare the marl:et allocation of resources benveen productiai and itdD
with the social optimum. The efï'ects determining this allocation between production :md R8D are ~~ell
documented by (among others) Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman ( 1991). Romer
(1990) and Stokey ( 1995), My paper focuses on dte allocation ol'(a ti~eJ amouni nll human capital
behveen di(7erent fornis of ftgD.
' More precisely, for the analysis here it is needed that the laboraton's p~y otts arr arirtl~ increasing in
the production firm's profits. This seems a natural assumption.
' A stron-er version of the idea that the ground covered today by organisatiun:d dian,e Joes nut
necessr~rily help the organisational chance of' tomorrow is found in the liillu~~ in- obscrvation by
Micklethwait and Wooldridge (199G: 20): 'Qeeriixs.c Wrek yuoted one Amcrican m:maccr J~liverin- his
verdict on management f:~shion: "Last year it was yuality circles ... this year it ~~ ill bc icru invemorics.
The truth is, one more fad and we will all go nuts." That was in 198G, and since then the veloci[y offads -
and theirability to contradict one another- has increased considerably'.
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